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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and 
corporate governance (proxied by board characteristics and shareholder 
structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence 
across listed companies in China during 2001-2011, and empirically 
demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance (especially for 
board characteristics) show higher performance persistence. The results are 
stronger for short horizons and for an accounting-based view. Overall, our 
empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other 
explanations, strongly suggest that a well-structured board with more 
independent directors, split positions for CEOs and the chairman as well as 
smaller boards favors performance persistence. In terms of the shareholder 
structure we find evidence that lower levels of State ownership and a non-
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1. Introduction 
China's developing economy is one of the fastest growing (for more than three decades), 
yet most centrally controlled in the world.  It is likely to overtake the United States (“the US”) 
in the near future. Chinese firms however are increasingly transitioning from previous state 
owned enterprises to modern firms (see Conyon and He, 2011). Within this transition process 
the question of how an appropriate governance structure should look like and how this 
translates into performance and its persistence gains is importance. In recent times, the 
presumed benefits of an “ideal” corporate governance structure have become one of the most 
contentious issues in academia, especially in relation to emerging markets in Asia where 
institutional settings are quite different from other parts of the arguably more “developed” 
world. For the US market Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) study the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance during the 1990s. They find evidence that stock returns of 
firms with strong shareholder rights outperform, on a risk-adjusted basis, returns of firms with 
weak shareholder rights by 8.5%/year during this decade. On the policy domain, corporate 
governance proponents have prominently cited this result as evidence that good governance 
(as measured by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s index) has a positive impact on corporate 
performance. There are however several shortcomings in general, and in particular for China. 
First, their index is based on defense mechanisms in M&A takeovers, which is clearly not the 
important issue for the Chinese market. Secondly, the performance and governance 
relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between governance and (stock market) performance and the chosen instrument 
to bridge the endoogeneity problem. In the context of China Cheung at. al. (2010) study the 
impact of corporate governance on performance, but there is no evidence of performance 
persistence, which is the point of reference most commonly favored by investors.  
We find that different aspects of corporate governance are reflected unequally in 
explaining performance persistence. Board characteristics are more important in explaining 
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performance persistence compared to the shareholder structure. Furthermore, our results are 
stronger for accounting-based measures with shorter time horizon compared to market-based 
and longer time horizons. Overall, the data provide support for the idea that a well-structured 
board with more independent directors, split positions for CEOs and the chairman as well as 
smaller boards favors performance persistence. In terms of the shareholder structure we find 
evidence that lower levels of State ownership and a non-concentrated blockholder structure is 
positively associated with performance persistence.  
This paper is organized as follows. Hypotheses are presented in section 2. In section 3 we 
introduce the data and outline the empirical models. Section 4 provides multivariate tests. 
Concluding remarks follow in the last section. 
2. Corporate Governance and Performance Persistence 
In contrast to the oft-cited paper by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) studying the 
impact of corporate governance on firm performance, we study how different aspects of 
corporate governance are related to performance persistence.  
2.1. Board Characteristics 
China operates a two-tier board system consisting of a main board of directors and a 
supervisory board. Traditionally, the state has huge influence on the appointment of board and 
supervisory board members. To improve economic efficiency and due to shareholder pressure 
China has moved towards a free-enterprise system and orientated its corporate governance 
structures to Anglo-Saxon systems. An important example of this is the Code of Corporate 
Governance issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. This code requires firms 
to add independent directors to the main board of directors. The expectation is that one-third 
of the board should comprise independent directors (see Conyon and He, 2011). It is 
frequently argued that independent outside directors have more incentives to effectively 
monitor the CEO because they are less subject to CEO influence and have reputations to 
protect in the labor market (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Core et al., 1999; 
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Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 2003, and Bhagat and Black, 2002). Inside directors, on the 
other hand, are more loyal to the CEO and the CEO can exert larger influence over them by 
controlling such factors as their career opportunities. Furthermore, those directors are more 
likely to be state-appointed bureaucrats being ineffective in monitoring management (Fan et 
al., 2007). Unfortunately, it is impossible to obtain information on the levels of director 
remuneration, but we are able to ascertain whether remuneration is indeed received. In this 
context Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Adams and Ferreira (2008) show that individuals 
commonly perform better when paid more rather than less, but they may also perform better if 
they are not paid at all rather than paid only a small amount.  
In addition, previous research argues that board effectiveness is influenced by the size of 
the board. Yermack (1996) argues that large boards are less effective than small boards, 
because they may suffer from free-riding problems in decision-making and control thereby 
diluting monitoring capabilities. Similarly boards that combine the posts of CEO and 
chairperson vest more power with the CEO, and may suffer greater agency costs (Jensen, 
1993). However, following the argumentation of Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) a 
separation could also induce costs that could possible outweigh its benefits, e.g. large firms 
could grant both titles to attract good-performing CEOs.  
Finally, we use board activity (board monitoring), as proxied by the number of board 
meetings. Vafeas (1999) argues that a higher number is followed by poor performance and 
those poorly performing firms that increase the number of board meetings improve their 
performance in subsequent years. 
In sum, we expect that a higher independence and monitoring efforts affect stock 
performance persistence, as stated in the five testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1. Board Size decreases the probability of performance persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Board Independence increases the probability of performance persistence. 
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Hypothesis 3. Percentage of Non-Paid Directors increases the probability of performance 
persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Combining the posts of CEO and chairperson decreases the probability of 
performance persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Number of Board Meetings decreases the probability of performance 
persistence. 
 
2.2. Shareholder Structure   
The Level of ownership concentration has important consequences on the monitoring of a 
company’s management. Agency theory predicts that when ownership is dispersed, individual 
owners have weak incentives to invest in monitoring and to exert influence over key corporate 
decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This incentive problem may be reduced by 
concentrated share ownership. It is widely believed that large shareholders’ monitoring 
activities can be very effective in solving agency problems that arise from the separation of 
ownership and control (see, for example, the seminal work of Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). A 
high equity stake in the company provides block-holders and controlling shareholders with 
strong incentives to supervise managerial activities (Jensen and Warner, 1988). As a result, 
concentrated ownership often indicates that shareholders are able to better guard their 
interests in their firms. Core et al. (1999) and Shivdasani (1993) thus hypothesize that large 
share stakes by outside shareholders will mitigate potential CEO entrenchment. Set against 
the beneficial effects of concentrated ownership are the costs associated with entrenchment 
and private benefits of control of a single large shareholder. Large shareholders may 
expropriate minority shareholders, or promote their own objectives over those of other 
shareholders. This may occur via tunneling or other rent extraction strategies (La Porta et al., 
2000; Wang and Xiao, 2011). Johnson et al. (2000) use the term ‘tunneling’ to describe the 
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transfer of resources away from firms for the benefits of their controlling shareholders. The 
tunneling of firm value by controlling shareholders, including activities ranging from outright 
theft and loan guarantees to selling assets or products below market prices, has thus become a 
centerpiece of recent corporate finance and drawn widespread attention. 
The problem of expropriation by controlling shareholders is extremely severe in Chinese 
stock markets because of a more primitive disclosure system and in general weak corporate 
governance mechanisms (Ding et al., 2007). With increasing State ownership in a company 
the higher is the likelihood that the top management team are bureaucrats and managerial 
quality may be lower than in privately controlled firms (Firth et al., 2007). Furthermore, State 
“controlled” firms might pursue political or multiple objectives, such as employment growth, 
rather than profit maximization.  
In contrast a higher stock ownership of board members is expected to better align the 
interests of management with its shareholders. Consequently, an increasing ownership of 
management is as expected to be positively correlated with better contemporaneous and 
subsequent operating performance (see Bhagat, Carey, and Elson, 1999).  
In sum, we expect that the distribution of ownership rights affect stock performance 
persistence, as stated in the four testable hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 6. Higher State ownership decreases the probability of performance persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 7. Higher executive management ownership increases the probability of 
performance persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 8. Concentrated ownership increases the probability of performance 
persistence. 
 
Hypothesis 9. Dominating ownership decreases the probability of performance persistence. 
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3. Data  
3.1. Data Source 
Our study uses data on publically traded Chinese firms listed on the domestic exchanges 
from January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2010. We combined three separate data sets. First, the 
corporate governance data were supplied by the China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance 
Research Database. Second, the financial performance data were obtained from the China 
Stock Market Trading Database (CSMAR) and (third) accounting data were taken from China 
Stock Market Financial Statement Database (CSMAR). Together these data sets account for 
almost all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The data sets have 
been used in previous research (Kato and Long, 2006b; Chen et al., 2010a, 2010b; Conyon 
and He, 2011). It is important to comment on the quality of corporate governance data. 
CSMAR data are collected directly from public firms' annual financial reports as published in 
Securities Time, Shanghai Securities Daily, China Securities Daily, and other major 
newspapers designated by CSRC. The combined data set consisted of 988 unique publicly 
traded firms on the two domestic Chinese exchanges for the years 2001 to 2011. In our 
empirical work below, we estimate panel data models using firm fixed effects and two-
dimensional clustered standard errors (see Petersen, 2009). This required the firms to have at 
least two (six) consecutive years of data for one (three) year performance persistence. Overall, 
the selection procedure resulted in a final sample of 988 (580) unique firms with 5,102 
(2,138) firm-year observations. The panel data set has multiple time-series observations per 
firm (i.e. it is unbalanced) reflecting the fact that firms join or leave the stock exchanges. For 
variable summary statistics see Table 1.  
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
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4. Multivariate Tests 
4.1. Regression Models 
We estimate the following fixed-effects panel data model, controlling for firm size and 
leverage, ownership structure and boardroom governance: The independent variable of 
interest is the performance persistence of the firms, defined in two ways. First, Return on 
Assets (net profits divided by the book value of assets) as an accounting-based measure. 
Second, we use a market-based measure (see Cumming et al, 2012): 1 (3)-year CAPM alphas 
and prior 1 (3)-year alphas (lagged 1 (3) years so that there is no overlap in measurement). 
Our dataset is structured as a panel that has 580 stocks with performance statistics with at 
least 2-successive periods of 3-year alphas over the years 2001-2010. One limiting factor is 
the requirement of a rather long return series of six consecutive years. To determine whether 
performance persistence lasts for short- or medium-term horizons we, we conducted a further 
calculation that includes the 1-year alpha in addition to the 3-year alpha and the 1 (3)-year 
ROAs. This reduces the required time span and consequently increases our sample size to 580 
stocks. The basic structure of our regression equations are: 
∙ ∑ ∙ ∑ ∙         (1) 
	 ∙ 	 ∑ ∙ ∑ ∙       (2) 
Positive coefficients on  imply performance persistence attributable to different aspects 
of corporate governance as alphas / ROAs interacted with corporate governance proxies 
positively predicting future alphas and the  coefficient is the sole determinant of the degree 
of return persistence that cannot be explained by corporate governance proxies. By contrast, 
insignificant coefficients on  imply no evidence of performance persistence. Negative and 
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significant coefficients for  imply the company performance has negative performance 
persistence. The regression estimates for equation (1) and (2) appear in Table 2 and 3. 
4.2. Regression Results 
Tables 2 and 3 presents the regression results for equation (1) and (2) with two Panels (A 
and B are related to 1-year-ROAs (alphas) and 3-year-ROAs (alphas)) respectively and 11 
regression models in total. Models (1) – (10) show the results for the corporate governance 
proxies separately whereas model (11) shows results for simultaneous inclusion of all 
variables.   
Panel A of Table 2 provides strong statistical support for Hypotheses 1 to 4. We find as 
predicted that larger boards and simultaneous position of CEO and chairman reduces 
statistical significantly performance persistence. Whereas more non-paid directors and board 
independency increase performance persistence significantly. Admittedly we find no support 
for our Hypothesis 5 that more board meetings decrease the probability of performance 
persistence. Board impedance and joint position of CEO and chairman are also significant in 
the full model. Admittedly we find only support for our hypotheses on non-paid directors and 
joint position of CEO and chairman when focusing on three year alphas (see Panel B of Table 
2).  
The results for the shareholder structure are less obvious. First of we find evidence that a 
higher State ownership reduces performance persistence (also remains significant in the full 
model), which is clearly support for our Hypothesis 6 for one year ROAs. Interestingly, we 
find mixed evidence for the owner ship structure concentration (Hypothesis 7). For shorter 
time horizons we find that the higher the percentage of equity is held by big blockholders the 
higher is the performance persistence (also significant in the full model), but for longer time 
horizon the relationship reverses (see Table 2). Finally, we find support for our Hypothesis 9 
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that a dominating role of blockholders might raise concerns about tunneling, which harms 
other shareholders and reduces performance persistence.  
Focusing on a market based view on performance persistence, we find by far weaker 
results and support for our hypotheses (see Table 3). In the short term we find analogous to 
the accounting-based view that a joint position of CEO and chairman reduces performance 
persistence (support for Hypotheses 3 and 4). The latter is the only significant variable in the 
full model. For the 3-year alphas we find only one significant influence on performance 
persistence, namely the percentage of shares owned by executives. 
 
– Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here – 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate association of corporate governance and performance 
persistence. We test our hypotheses, based on several proxy variables for listed Chinese 
companies spanning the years 2001-2010. We find the board characteristics are more 
important in explaining performance persistence compared to the shareholder structure. 
Furthermore, our results are stronger for accounting-based measures with shorter time horizon 
compared to market-based and longer time horizons. Overall, the data provide support for the 
idea that a well-structured board with more independent directors, split positions for CEOs 
and the chairman as well as smaller boards favors performance persistence. In terms of the 
shareholder structure we find evidence that lower levels of State ownership and a non-
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Table 1. Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics 
This table defines the main variables used in the paper—see Appendix for detailed description. Summary statistics are also provided for each variable. The data are for the period 
January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2010. 
Panel A: 1-Year 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Alpha 5,102 -0.00041 0.03406 -0.11658 -0.0195 -0.00256 0.0164 0.34183 
Number of Directors 5,102 9.54332 2.19121 3 9 9 11 19 
% Independent Directors 5,102 0.32416 0.09876 0 0.33333 0.33333 0.36364 0.71429 
% Non-Paid Directors 5,102 0.29673 0.21538 0 0.11111 0.30769 0.44444 1 
Chairman Equal to General Manager 5,102 0.1421 0.34919 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of Board Meetings 5,102 8.28165 3.41791 2 6 8 10 36 
Shares Legal Entities 5,102 0.03469 0.10097 0 0 0 0 0.70546 
% Shares State-Owned 5,102 0.26223 0.2534 0 0 0.24056 0.49267 0.89783 
% Shares Executives 5,102 0.00685 0.04477 0 0 0 0 0.75378 
% Shares Largest Shareholder 5,102 38.50031 16.38498 0.39 25.86 36.44 51 86.42 
Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder 5,102 0.47104 0.27128 0.00015 0.23325 0.42365 0.71936 0.98762 
Market Value 5,102 0.00964 0.0701 0.00022 0.00138 0.00231 0.00448 2.54825 
Leverage 5,102 0.53461 1.09907 0.00814 0.34439 0.48612 0.62327 55.40864 
ROA 5,102 0.03458 0.17219 -4.15791 0.0157 0.04319 0.07458 2.34011 
Panel B: 3-Years 
Variable n Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Alpha 2,138 0.00093 0.03179 -0.07513 -0.01582 -0.00063 0.01627 0.11165 
Number of Directors 2,138 9.58746 2.19415 5 9 9 11 16
% Independent Directors 2,138 0.30082 0.11357 0 0.28571 0.33333 0.36364 0.5 
% Non-Paid Directors 2,138 0.32325 0.22442 0 0.125 0.33333 0.46667 0.88889 
Chairman Equal to General Manager 2,138 0.12862 0.33486 0 0 0 0 1
Number of Board Meetings 2,138 8.03976 3.30352 3 6 7 10 20 
Shares Legal Entities 2,138 0.05602 0.12235 0 0 0 0.03586 0.59162 
% Shares State-Owned 2,138 0.30255 0.24422 0 0 0.31401 0.5144 0.75272
% Shares Executives 2,138 0.00018 0.00068 0 0 0 0 0.00556 
% Shares Largest Shareholder 2,138 38.5192 16.4449 7.02 25.96 36.5 51.531 75.84 
Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder 2,138 0.49194 0.27745 0.0528 0.23984 0.45307 0.75259 0.97445
Market Value 2,138 0.00434 0.00716 0.00045 0.00137 0.00226 0.00416 0.05215 
Leverage 2,138 0.49943 0.19329 0.07792 0.37234 0.50472 0.62347 1.15812 
ROA 2,138 0.10198 0.16255 -0.73423 0.0435 0.11256 0.17831 0.48589
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Table 2. Multivariate Regressions for Return on Assets 
This table presents different models to estimate performance persistence with panel regressions. The dependent variable for Panel A and B is the 1-year ROA (3-year ROA) for 
each company for each year (winsorized at 99%).  Explanatory variables include the 1 (3)-year ROA (lagged by 1 (3) years), the interaction between lagged alpha and fund 
governance variables (Number of Directors, % Independent Directors, % Non-Paid Directors, Chairman Equal to General Manager, Number of Board Meetings, % Shares Legal 
Entities, % Shares State-Owned, % Shares Executives, % Shares Largest Shareholder, Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder), Leverage and Market Value. Variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. Select variables excluded in different regression to check for collinearity. Regressions are presented for the full model (m11), as well as separately for different 
governance variables. Data source: CSMAR (China Stock Market Financial Statement Database), CSMAR (China Stock Market Trading Database) and China Listed Firm’s 
Corporate Governance Research Database. Sample period: January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2010. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: 1-Year ROA m11 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 
           
1-Year Lagged ROA 0.419*** 0.590*** 0.546*** 0.100* 0.223*** 0.245*** 0.174*** 0.214*** 0.199*** 0.328*** 0.276*** 
(3.92) (6.8) (14.33) (2.42) (13.38) (7.39) (10.28) (11.86) (12.21) (13.00) (11.50) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x Number of Directors -0.023 -0.046*** 
(-1.83) (-4.59) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Independent Directors 0.789*** 0.667*** 
(3.97) (3.56) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Non-Paid Directors 0.201* 0.189* 
(2.14) (2.56) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x Chairman Equal to General Manager -0.289*** -0.301*** 
(-5.54) (-6.31) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x Number of Board Meetings -0.002 -0.005 
(-0.59) (-1.61) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Legal Entities 1.360*** 0.967*** 
(6.82) (4.99) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares State-Owned 0.544*** -0.160* 
(4.51) (-1.99) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Executives 0.033 -0.42 
(0.03) (-0.34) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Largest Shareholder -0.017*** -0.006*** 
(-7.03) (-6.69) 
1-Year Lagged ROA x Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder 0.831*** -0.299*** 
(4.53) (-4.39) 
Leverage 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
(7.40) (8.81) (6.82) (8.24) (8.71) (8.46) (8.84) (8.2)8 (8.51) (7.1) (7.74) 
Market Value -0.076 -0.076 -0.055 -0.07 -0.065 -0.079 -0.076 -0.086 -0.081 -0.074 -0.076 
(-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.49) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-0.64) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.57) 
Constant 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 
(6.69) (4.48) (5.85) (4.41) (4.01) (3.78) (4.12) (4.22) (3.85) (5.66) (4.88) 
N 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 




Table 2. Multivariate Regressions for Return on Assets—Continued 
 
Panel B: 3-Year ROA m11 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 
           
3-Year Lagged ROA 0.008 -0.209* 0.290*** -0.252*** -0.127*** -0.055 -0.120*** -0.162*** -0.127*** 0.03 0.029 
 (0.07) (-2.20) -5.7 (-5.99) (-4.29) (-1.08) (-3.68) (-4.77) (-4.34) -0.55 -0.65 
3-Year Lagged ROA x Number of Directors 0.003 0.009 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Independent Directors 0.468 0.468 
 (1.78) (1.78) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Non-Paid Directors 0.335*** 0.333*** 
 (4.1) (4.07) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x Chairman Equal to General Manager -0.005 -0.015 
 (-0.09) (-0.24) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x Number of Board Meetings -0.011* -0.009 
 (-2.22) (-1.74) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Legal Entities -0.211 -0.087 
 (-1.38) (-0.59) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares State-Owned 0.481*** 0.191 
 (4.2) (1.94) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Executives -18.505 -8.619 
 (-0.65) (-0.30) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x % Shares Largest Shareholder -0.003 -0.005*** 
 (-1.19) (-3.35) 
3-Year Lagged ROA x Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder -0.439** -0.421*** 
 (-2.81) (-4.56) 
Leverage 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.143*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.119*** 0.118*** 
 (3.48) (4.11) (4.65) (4.05) (4.06) (4.23) (3.97) (4.12) (4.05) (3.74) (3.74) 
Market Value -2.212*** -2.212*** -1.766** -2.072** -2.182*** -1.972** -2.208*** -2.153*** -2.171*** -2.390*** -2.351*** 
 (3.50) (-3.50) (-2.88) (-3.30) (-3.45) (-3.07) (-3.49) (-3.41) (-3.42) (-3.78) (-3.74) 
Constant 0.046* 0.042* 0.038* 0.046** 0.044* 0.039* 0.044* 0.039* 0.044* 0.056** 0.056** 
 (2.57) (2.37) (2.23) (2.6) (2.49) (2.21) (2.52) (2.22) (2.49) (3.11) (3.17) 
N 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 




Table 3. Multivariate Regressions for “Alpha” 
This table presents different models to estimate performance persistence with panel regressions. The dependent variable for Panel A and B is the 1-year alpha (3-year alpha) for 
each company for each year (winsorized at 99%).  Explanatory variables include the 1 (3)-year alpha (lagged by 1 (3) years), the interaction between lagged alpha and fund 
governance variables (Number of Directors, % Independent Directors, % Non-Paid Directors, Chairman Equal to General Manager, Number of Board Meetings, % Shares Legal 
Entities, % Shares State-Owned, % Shares Executives, % Shares Largest Shareholder, Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder), Leverage and Market Value. Variables are as defined 
in Appendix A. Select variables excluded in different regression to check for collinearity. Regressions are presented for the full model (m11), as well as separately for different 
governance variables. Data source: CSMAR (China Stock Market Financial Statement Database), CSMAR (China Stock Market Trading Database) and China Listed Firm’s 
Corporate Governance Research Database. Sample period: January 1, 2001 – December 31, 2010. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics 
are in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: 1-Year Alpha m11 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 
           
1-Year Lagged Alpha -0.133 -0.199** 0.015 -0.154*** -0.074*** -0.092* -0.089*** -0.120*** -0.091*** -0.153*** -0.114*** 
(-0.94) (-2.77) -0.18 (-5.92) (-4.40) (-2.29) (-5.50) (-5.55) (-5.70) (-3.83) (-3.54) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x Number of Directors 0.007 0.011 
(0.84) (1.51) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Independent Directors -0.17 -0.31 
(-0.67) (-1.32) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Non-Paid Directors 0.168 0.230** 
(1.94) (2.92) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x Chairman Equal to General Manager -0.137** -0.150** 
(-2.86) (-3.20) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x Number of Board Meetings -0.001 0 
(-0.31) (-0.05) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Legal Entities -0.343 -0.285 
(-1.54) (-1.33) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares State-Owned -0.001 0.121 
(-0.01) (1.8) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Executives -0.339 -0.443 
(-0.73) (-0.99) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Largest Shareholder 0.002 0.002 
(1.05) (1.62) 
1-Year Lagged Alpha x Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder -0.071 0.043 
(-0.75) (0.73) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
(-0.6)1 (-0.62) (-0.6) (-0.6) (-0.6) (-0.59) (-0.6) (-0.56) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.58) 
Market Value -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.222*** -0.222*** -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.224*** -0.223*** 
(-7.68) (-7.67) (-7.68) (-7.64) (-7.66) (-7.66) (-7.68) (-7.67) (-7.67) (-7.69) (-7.67) 
Constant -0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
(-1.20) (2.27) (2.27) (2.35) (2.36) (2.3) (2.27) (2.329 (2.32) (2.28) (2.31) 
N 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 5,102 





Table 4. Multivariate Regressions for “Alpha”—Continued 
 
Panel B: 3-Year Alpha m11 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 
b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
3-Year Lagged Alpha 0.2 -0.048 0.033 -0.157** -0.130*** -0.111 -0.122*** -0.132** -0.101*** -0.124 -0.105 
-0.8 (-0.36) (0.25) (-3.07) (-4.10) (-1.40) (-3.88) (-2.79) (-3.31) (-1.71) (-1.75) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x Number of Directors -0.016 -0.008 
(-1.14) (-0.55) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Independent Directors -0.517 -0.456 
(-1.20) (-1.17) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Non-Paid Directors 0.113 0.127 
(0.73) -0.89 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x Chairman Equal to General Manager 0.107 0.08 
(1.18) (0.91) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x Number of Board Meetings -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.09) (-0.13) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Legal Entities -0.054 0.049 
(-0.17) (0.17) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares State-Owned 0.069 0.041 
(0.42) (0.32) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Executives -107.559** -97.598** 
(-2.94) (-2.72) 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x % Shares Largest Shareholder 0.000 0.000 
(0.03) -0.06 
3-Year Lagged Alpha x Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder -0.059 -0.033 
(-0.33) (-0.30) 
Leverage -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 
(-1.31) (-1.21) (-1.15) (-1.17) (-1.25) (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.24) (-1.20) (-1.20) 
Market Value -0.752*** -0.752*** -0.745*** -0.748*** -0.741*** -0.748*** -0.752*** -0.749*** -0.707*** -0.752*** -0.754*** 
(-3.61) (-3.62) (-3.59) (-3.60) (-3.56) (-3.56) (-3.62) (-3.60) (-3.40) (-3.62) (-3.63) 
Constant 0.004 0,007 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 
(0.8) (1.36) (1.28) (1.3) (1.38) (1.34) (1.34) (1.33) (1.36) (1.34 (1.34) 
N 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 2,138 





Table A: Variable Definitions 
This table gives a detailed description of the data gathering process and the calculation method for all variables.  
   
Variable Variable ID Description and Calculation 
Stock Data:  
Monthly Return Mretwd 
Monthly returns of all A-shares listed on 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
Market Value Msmvttl 
Market values of all A-shares listed on 
Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges 
Market Data:    
Monthly Equally Weighted 
Market Return 
Mretwdeq 
Monthly equally weighted market return with 
cash dividends reinvested 
Risk-Free Rate Nrrdata CSMAR risk-free rate 




Total liabilities/Total assets 
Income Statement:  
Return on Assets 
B001000000/ 
A001000000 
Total profits/Total assets 
Governance: 
Number of Directors Y1101a 
Total number of directors (including board 
chairman) in the company’s board of directors 
% Independent Directors Y1101b/Y1101a 
The ratio of independent directors to total 
directors in percent 
% Non-Paid Directors Y1601b/Y1101a 
The ratio of non-paid directors to total directors 
in percent. Including number of directors 
(independent directors excluded), supervisors 
(independent supervisors excluded) and 
executives who inly receive allowance 
Chairman Equal to General 
Manager  
Y1001b 
Whether the board chairman and the general 
manager is the same person 
Number of Board Meetings A0101b Number of board meeting per year 
% Shares Legal Entities Nshrlpn/Nshrttl Percentage share of legal entities 
% Shares State-Owned Nshrglea/Nshrttl Percentage share of state-owned entities 
% Shares Executives Nshrsms/Nshrttl Percentage of shares owned by executives 
% Shares Largest Shareholder S0301b 
Percentage of ten largest shareholder voting 
rights  
Herfindahl Ten Largest Shareholder S0301b Herfindahl index for the ten largest shareholder 
 
